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ABSTRACT 
Since 2008, major oil and gas operators have invested billions attempting to 
drill Arctic Alaska’s Outer Continental Shelf. However, offshore drilling in 
the extreme Arctic is fraught with infrastructural, technological and 
environmental challenges that could result in enormous damages if an 
accident ever occurred. While offshore drilling operations would significantly 
benefit both the state of Alaska and the United States, it is imperative that the 
United States’ offshore regulatory regime adequately protects the Arctic 
Alaskan environment and innocent third parties. This Note examines the 
shortcomings of the United States’ current offshore drilling regulatory regime 
and proposes a four-part scheme that properly incentivizes operators to drill 
safely and adequately compensates damaged parties. The United States should 
revise its regulatory regime by: (1) significantly increasing the liability cap; 
(2) increasing an operator’s financial responsibility requirement in the form 
of mandatory third-party insurance; (3) establishing a risk-based premium 
fund; and (4) creating a supplementary fund from firms that extract 
hydrocarbons in excess of a specific threshold level. 
INTRODUCTION 
In 2008 the United States Department of the Interior raised 
international interest in Alaskan offshore drilling when it released the 
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United States Geological Survey (USGS) estimates of undiscovered oil 
and gas north of the Arctic Circle.1 The USGS report estimated that the 
territory north of the Arctic Circle holds 90 billion barrels of oil, 1,669 
trillion cubic feet of natural gas, and 44 billion barrels of natural gas 
liquids, 84% of which are located offshore.2 This amount represents an 
estimated 30% of the world’s undiscovered gas and 13% of the world’s 
undiscovered oil, with most located under fewer than 500 meters of 
water.3 The Bureau of Ocean Energy Management (BOEM) has 
estimated that Alaska’s offshore region contains 23 billion barrels of oil, 
primarily in the Beaufort and Chukchi Seas.4 
The potential profits from these hydrocarbons, coupled with longer 
ice-free seasons5 and advances in offshore drilling technology, have oil 
companies lining up to sink their drill bits into the Arctic’s offshore oil 
fields.6 However, as oil giant Shell has found out over the past few 
years, the Alaskan Arctic is a harsh and unforgiving environment, with 
long stretches of sea ice, freezing temperatures, months of darkness, 
extended periods of heavy fog, and extreme weeklong storms.7 
 
 1. USGS is a scientific bureau within the United States Department of 
Interior. U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, CIRCUM-ARCTIC 
RESOURCE APPRAISAL: ESTIMATES OF UNDISCOVERED OIL AND GAS NORTH OF ARCTIC 
CIRCLE 2008-3049 (Peter H. Stauffer ed., 2008) [hereinafter USGS APPRAISAL]. 
 2.  Id. at 4; Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, U.S. Geological Survey, 
90 Billion Barrels of Oil and 1,670 Trillion Cubic Feet of Natural Gas Assessed in 
the Arctic (Jul. 23, 2008), available at http://www.usgs.gov/newsroom/ 
article.asp?ID=1980#.U2vMo61dU5d. “These resources account for about 22 
percent of the undiscovered, technically recoverable resources in the world.” Id. 
 3.  U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, U.S. Geological Survey, supra note 2; Donald L. 
Gautier et al., Assessment of Undiscovered Oil and Gas in the Arctic, SCIENCE, vol. 
324 no. 5931, 2009, at 1175. 
 4. Margaret Kriz Hobson, Is Arctic Oil Exploration Dead in the U.S.?, ENERGY 
WIRE (July 18, 2013), http://www.eenews.net/energywire/stories/1059984582. 
 5.  Gary D. Clow et al., Climate Change Considerations, in U.S. GEOLOGICAL 
SURVEY CIRCULAR 1370: AN EVALUATION OF THE SCIENCE NEEDS TO INFORM 
DECISIONS ON OUTER CONTINENTAL SHELF ENERGY DEVELOPMENT IN THE CHUKCHI 
AND BEAUFORT SEAS, ALASKA (“USGS, CIRCULAR”) 81, 86–88 (Leslie Holland-
Bartels & Brenda Pierce eds., 2011), available at http://pubs.usgs.gov/ 
circ/1370/pdf/circ1370.pdf (“Environmental changes [from global warming] 
include . . . a marked decrease in the extent and thickness of sea ice . . . . 
[C]limate projections over the next 50–100 years . . . consistently show a 
pronounced warming over the Arctic [and] accelerated sea-ice loss . . . .”). 
 6.  See Jerry Beilinson, Everything You Need to Know About Shell Oil and Arctic 
Offshore Drilling in Alaska, POPULAR MECHANICS, (Sept. 14, 2012), 
http://www.popularmechanics.com/science/energy/coal-oil-gas/everything-
you-need-to-know-about-shell-oil-and-arctic-offshore-drilling-in-alaska-
10720112 (stating that some companies may start offshore drilling as early as 
2014 and 2015). 
 7.  THE PEW ENVIRONMENT GROUP, POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS: OIL SPILL 
PREVENTION AND RESPONSE IN THE U.S. ARCTIC OCEAN 2 (2012); see Hobson, supra 
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Furthermore, the Alaskan Arctic’s remote location is sparsely populated, 
and the infrastructure needed in the case of an accident—transportation, 
communications, and equipment—is virtually non-existent.8 Together, 
“the extreme physical environment and remote location and the 
unpredictable effects of climate change mean that the risks, difficulties 
and unknowns of oil exploration and development are far greater in the 
Arctic than in any other United States ocean area.”9 Furthermore, as 
opponents of drilling stress, obtaining oil in the Arctic presents 
additional challenges such as the area’s unique ecosystem,10 the Alaska 
Natives who rely on the environment for subsistence,11 and the fact that 
spill response and containment technologies are unproven in icy 
waters.12 
As offshore drilling in the Alaskan Arctic appears inevitable, it is 
imperative that the United States’ laws and regulations create the proper 
incentives for the oil companies to operate as safely as possible and 
ensure prompt clean up and restitution in the case of an accident. 
This Note examines the shortcomings of the United States’ offshore 
drilling regulatory scheme as well as alternative regulatory mechanisms, 
and ultimately proposes a four-part regulatory scheme that places the 
impetus to drill safely on the oil and gas industry. Part I outlines the role 
the oil and gas industry has played in shaping the state of Alaska, the 
local and federal benefits of offshore drilling, and the environmental 
risks of drilling in the Alaskan Arctic. Part II examines the issues with 
the United States’ current regulatory regime and potential alternatives. 
Part III recommends a four-part revised regulatory regime that: (1) 
significantly increases the strict liability cap; (2) requires increased 
 
note 4 (describing how Shell has, to date, been unable to drill any of its offshore 
Alaskan Arctic leases despite having invested over $5 billion); see also Matt 
Smith, Shell’s Arctic Dreams Postponed Another Year, CNN, (Jan. 30, 2014), 
http://www.cnn.com/2014/01/30/us/shell-arctic/ (“Shell has canceled plans 
to drill in the Arctic waters off Alaska this year . . . .”). 
 8.  See id. at 12 (“The nearest USCG station is nearly 950 air miles away, and 
the closest major port is Dutch Harbor, 1,300 miles away.”). 
 9.  Id. at 4. 
 10.  See id. at 3. (“[The Arctic environment] supports a variety of iconic 
marine mammals . . . [that] are found nowhere else in the United States. Millions 
of birds and various species of whales migrate great distances to the Arctic each 
year. More than 100 species of fish . . . are found there.”). 
 11.  See id. (“Indigenous communities along the coastline depend upon a 
healthy Arctic marine ecosystem to support the many species at the heart of 
their subsistence way of life.”). 
 12.  See, e.g., Leslie Holland-Bartles & Jonathan J. Kolak, Oil-Spill Response, 
and Impact, in USGS, CIRCULAR, supra note 5, at 109, 133 (“Recent barge trials on 
the Beaufort Sea demonstrated that even trace amounts of ice (less than 1/10 ice 
coverage) can cause significantly reduced efficiencies in mechanical recovery.”). 
NOTE - UNGER (DO NOT DELETE) 12/29/2014 12:36 PM 
266 ALASKA LAW REVIEW [31:2 
financial responsibility in the form of third-party insurance; (3) 
establishes a risk-based premium fund; and (4) creates a supplementary 
fund from contributions from firms that produce above a threshold 
level.13 
I. OVERVIEW 
The oil industry has been instrumental in shaping the character and 
economy of Alaska. Revenues from oil make up an enormous portion of 
Alaska’s contributions to the federal government.14 While there has been 
drilling in northern Alaska for decades, offshore drilling in its most 
remote locations is fraught with infrastructural and technological 
challenges, which could result in enormous damages if an accident ever 
occurred. As a result, it is imperative that the United States’ regulatory 
regime properly incentivizes firms to protect against such a risk. 
A. Oil: Shaping Modern Alaska 
The discovery of oil in Alaska has been instrumental to the state’s 
economic development and population growth. Today: 
Oil production currently accounts for approximately 93 percent 
of Alaska’s unrestricted general fund revenues, or $8.86 billion 
in fiscal year 2012. The general fund pays for almost every state 
service, including the education system, transportation 
infrastructure, public health and safety services, and a host of 
other programs throughout Alaska . . . . According to a special 
report by the University of Alaska’s Institute for Social and 
Economic Research (ISER), without oil, the economy in Alaska 
today would be only half its current size. A third of Alaska’s 
jobs, 127,000, are oil related and depend on oil production.15 
In Alaska, oil exploration and production have existed since the 
 
 13.  This note does not consider the broader policy question: whether the 
United States should allow offshore drilling on the Arctic Outer Continental 
Shelf (OCS) and instead assumes the decision has already been made. 
 14.  See Alex DeMarban, Will Offshore Oil Development in Alaska’s Arctic Make 
State Rich? Don’t Count on It., ALASKA DISPATCH NEWS (July 1, 2012), 
http://www.adn.com/article/will-offshore-oil-development-alaskas-arctic-
make-state-rich-dont-count-it (explaining that the majority of revenue from 
offshore leasing to oil companies and royalties from oil production in Alaska go 
to the federal government). 
 15.  Alaska’s Oil and Gas Industry, RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT COUNCIL, 
http://www.akrdc.org/issues/oilgas/overview.html (last visited Sept. 17, 
2014). 
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early 1900s.16 Oil discoveries in the 1950s led to great economic interest 
and, following the granting of statehood in 1959, oil companies 
vigorously explored the State.17 These explorations led to the discovery 
of a number of successful sites containing billions of gallons of oil and 
natural gas.18 For example, the upper Cook Inlet has supplied nearly 1.3 
billion barrels of oil and 5 trillion cubic feet of natural gas to date.19 
In 1967, North America’s largest oil field was discovered at 
Prudhoe Bay on the Arctic Coast.20 Enormous investment poured into 
the area, beginning in 1973 for the trans-Alaska pipeline,21 and 
continuing in 1977 to produce the North Slope oil field.22 The 
construction of the pipeline cost $7.7 billion and resulted in economic 
booms for both Fairbanks and Anchorage.23 “For three decades, Alaska’s 
North Slope has produced about 20% of the domestic oil used in the 
United States.”24 As a result, Alaska’s economy is highly dependent on 
the production of oil.  
B. Benefits Of Offshore Drilling 
With oil revenues from the North Slope reserves expected to wind 
down in the next few decades,25 and production already beginning to 
slow,26 the Alaskan economy would greatly benefit from offshore 
drilling on the Outer Continental Shelf (OCS).27 Harvesting the 
 
 16.  Modern Alaska, Oil Discovery and Development in Alaska, ALASKA HISTORY 
AND CULTURAL STUDIES, http://www.akhistorycourse.org/articles/ 
article.php?artID=140 (last visited Sept. 17, 2014). 
 17.  Id. 
 18.  Id. 
 19.  Id. And “[t]he Cook inlet oil and gas area is classified as [only] a 
moderate-sized deposit.” Id. 
 20.  Id. 
 21.  Id. Authorization to construct the pipeline was hotly contested. 
Following approval from the House of Representatives, the Senate was equally 
divided 49-49 and Vice President Spiro Agnew cast the deciding vote to approve 
the pipeline. Id. 
 22.  Id. 
 23.  See id. (“Unemployment dropped to near zero.”). 
 24.  Id. 
 25.  Id. (noting that the North Slope may be able to constantly produce at 
close to existing levels for only “thirty or forty more years”). 
 26.  See Beilinson, supra note 6 (“Prudhoe Bay’s oil output was only 205 
million barrels [in 2011], down more than two-thirds from its peak of 722 million 
in 1988.”). 
 27.  See RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT COUNCIL, supra note 15 (“According to a 
special report by the University of Alaska’s Institute for Social and Economic 
Research [], without oil, the economy in Alaska today would be only half its 
current size. A third of Alaska’s jobs, 127,000, are oil related and depend on oil 
production.”). 
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goldmine of offshore oil would ensure Alaska’s position as a 
predominant energy-producing state and could spur investment and 
economic growth in America’s last frontier for decades to come.28 
On a national level, the Obama administration has stated its goal is 
to promote “safe and responsible domestic oil and gas production as 
part of a comprehensive, all-of-the-above energy strategy to grow 
America’s energy economy and continue to reduce our dependence on 
foreign oil.”29 Whether or not offshore drilling in Arctic Alaska occurs 
will affect America’s demand for oil (and other forms of energy) 
supplied by other sources, such as on-land drilling, pipeline imports 
from Canada, or tanker imports from other foreign countries.30 
Currently, and for the foreseeable future, the United States will be the 
world’s largest per-capita consumer of crude oil.31 If drilling in the 
Alaskan Arctic could be conducted safely, it would help meet the United 
States’ demand and therefore help achieve the President’s goal of 
limiting American reliance on imported energy sources.32 Additionally, 
offshore drilling is a huge economic stimulus for the national 
government as “[a]nnual federal proceeds from offshore leases have 
ranged as high as $18 billion in recent years, second only to income taxes 
as a revenue source.”33 
 
 28.  See Hobson, supra note 4 (noting that the Beaufort and Chukchi Seas 
contain an estimated 23 billion barrels of oil). 
 29.  Bureau of Ocean Energy Mgmt.’s Offshore Oil and Gas Leasing Under the 
Current Five Year Outer Continental Shelf Oil and Gas Leasing Program: Hearing 
Before the H. Comm. on Natural Resources, 112th Cong. 1 (2012) (statement of 
Tommy P. Beaudreau, Director, Bureau of Energy Mgmt.). 
 30.  ALAN KRUPNIK ET AL., RESOURCES FOR THE FUTURE, UNDERSTANDING THE 
COSTS AND BENEFITS OF DEEPWATER OIL DRILLING REGULATION 7 (2011), available at 
http://www.rff.org/RFF/Documents/RFF-DP-10-62.pdf. 
 31.  Tyler Priest, Yes: The Risks Are Overstated, the Benefits Understated, in 
Should the U.S. Expand Offshore Oil Drilling?, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 14, 2013), 
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB1000142412788732402050457839861085
1042612. 
 32.  But see Hobson, supra note 4 (“Some industry experts have predicted 
that Shell’s setbacks, together with the shale oil and gas boom in the lower 48, 
have seriously damaged the prospects for Arctic exploration.”). In recent years 
hydraulic fracturing or “fracking” has become increasingly popular as a means 
of extracting natural gas. Derek Thompson, Shut Up and Drill: Why Fracking 
Could End the Age of Gas Price Spikes, THE ATLANTIC (Aug. 8, 2013), 
http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2013/08/shut-up-and-drill-
why-fracking-could-end-the-age-of-gas-price-spikes/278494/. While the 
practice has become increasingly controversial, fracking, and other energy 
sources for that matter, directly affect the economic appeal and decision-making 
involved in whether or not to pursue drilling operations in Arctic Alaska. See id. 
(discussing the benefits to fracking, including the flexibility that fracking brings 
to the supply chain). 
 33.  Priest, supra note 31. 
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If offshore drilling could be safely conducted on the Arctic Alaskan 
OCS, it could provide enormous benefits for the state of Alaska and 
greatly reduce both the United States’ dependence on foreign oil and the 
need to invest in alternative energy sources. 
C. Existing Offshore Drilling In Alaska 
There have been about thirty offshore wells drilled in the Beaufort 
and Chukchi Seas since the 1980s and early 1990s,34 however, these wells 
are located in shallow waters, close to shore.35 Further, there has been 
little leasing activity since 1996, and no new wells have begun 
production since then.36 However, after the 2008 USGS report, there has 
been a flurry of new leasing activity.37 
Recent exploratory drilling attempts by Royal Dutch Shell PLC 
(“Shell”) have highlighted the technical challenges of drilling far from 
shore on the Alaskan Arctic OCS.38 In 2012, Shell began exploratory 
drilling, planning to drill two wells in the Beaufort Sea and three wells 
in the Chukchi Sea.39 However, Shell ran into numerous complications 
and setbacks, resulting in its drilling operations being suspended—first 
until July 2013,40 and more recently until summer 2015 at the earliest.41 
Shell’s issues included groundings of its vessels, violations of 
environmental and safety regulations, weather delays, the collapse of its 
spill-containment equipment, and other failures.42 After Shell’s dismal 
 
 34.  Beilinson, supra note 6. 
 35.  See id. (stating that oil production has taken place just off the Alaska 
coast on artificial islands for years). 
 36.  BUREAU OF OCEAN ENERGY MGMT., LEASE SALES ALASKA OCS REGION 1 
(2014), available at http://www.boem.gov/uploadedFiles/BOEM/ 
About_BOEM/BOEM_Regions/Alaska_Region/Leasing_and_Plans/Leasing/H
istorical_Alaska_Region_Lease_Sales.pdf. 
 37.  See id. (showing that, in 2008, the United States sold hundreds of new 
leases). 
 38.  Greg Rehmke, Offshore Alaska Drilling: Private Effort Versus Regulatory 
Constraints, MASTER RESOURCE (July 17, 2013), http://www.masterresource.org/ 
2013/07/drilling-oil-alaska/. 
 39.  Beilinson, supra note 6. But see Shell Charts Return to Offshore Alaska 
Drilling in July, REUTERS (Dec. 4, 2013), http://www.reuters.com/article/ 
2013/12/04/shell-alaska-offshore-idUSL2N0JJ21920131204 (demonstrating 
Shell’s plans to use new technology—a containment dome and relief drill—in 
2015, which will be able to contain spills that may occur). 
 40.  Shell Charts Return to Offshore Alaska Drilling in July, supra note 39. 
 41.  Joanna M. Foster, Shell Suspends 2014 Offshore Drilling Plans in Arctic, 
CLIMATE PROGRESS (Jan. 30, 2014), http://thinkprogress.org/climate/ 
2014/01/30/3225831/shell-arctic-drilling-2014/. 
 42.  See id. (“Late permits, dangerous ice conditions and embarrassing 
equipment failures, all forced Shell out of the Arctic before a single well had 
been completed. Even as the company was moving equipment to warmer 
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performance in the Arctic in 2012, other Arctic OCS leaseholders Statoil 
ASA and ConocoPhillips43 have suspended Arctic exploration until at 
least 2015.44 
D. Risks Of Arctic Drilling 
While the oil industry has been instrumental in the development of 
the state of Alaska, it has not been without disaster. The Exxon Valdez oil 
tanker spill off Prince William Sound in 1989 was the largest oil spill in 
United States history before Deepwater Horizon.45 The tanker spilled more 
than 11 million gallons of crude oil when it crashed into a reef,46 
contaminating more than 1,200 miles of shoreline,47 killing hundreds of 
thousands of seabirds and marine animals,48 and illustrating the 
complexity of oil-spill cleanup in Alaska as local, national, and 
industrial organizations struggled to respond to the spill.49 After more 
than twenty years of cleanup, the environmental impact of the Exxon 
Valdez spill is still felt in Prince William Sound, and may take centuries 
to completely disappear.50 
More recently, the Deepwater Horizon blowout at the Macondo well 
in the Gulf of Mexico demonstrated the devastating effects of an 
offshore oil drilling disaster.51 In April 2010, British Petroleum’s (BP) 
 
waters, one of its drill ships, the Kulluk, ran aground.”); John Broder, With 2 
Ships Damaged, Shell Suspends Arctic Drilling, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 27, 2013), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/28/business/energy-environment/shell-
suspends-arctic-drilling-for-2013.html (demonstrating difficulties encountered 
by the drillships Noble Discoverer and Kulluk). 
 43.  Conoco Halts Offshore Drilling in Alaskan Arctic, AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE 
(Apr. 10, 2013), http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/news/afp/130410/ 
conoco-halts-offshore-drilling-alaskan-arctic. 
 44.  Priest, supra note 31. 
 45.  Ten Largest Oil Spills in the U.S., INFOPLEASE (2013), http:// 
www.infoplease.com/science/environment/largest-oil-spills-united-states.html. 
 46.  Exxon Valdez Spill Profile, U.S. ENVIR. PROTECTION AGENCY, http:// 
www.epa.gov/oem/content/learning/exxon.htm (last visited Sept. 13, 2014). 
 47.  Oil Plagues Sound 20 Years After, NBC NEWS (Mar. 24, 2009), 
http://www.nbcnews.com/id/29838444/#.UtAmGWRDsqQ. 
 48.  Id. 
 49.  See Exxon Valdez Spill Profile, supra note 46 (“The size of the spill and its 
remote location, accessible only by helicopter and boat, made government and 
industry efforts difficult and tested existing plans for dealing with such an 
event.”). 
 50.  Oil Plagues Sound 20 Years After, supra note 47. Furthermore, many of the 
effects of the damage may not be felt until well after an incident. For example, 
the economic loss of the herring industry in Prince William Sound (about $400 
million in discounted foregone profits) was not realized until nearly a decade 
after Exxon Valdez. KRUPNICK ET AL., supra note 30, at 25. 
 51.  See RESOURCES FOR THE FUTURE, CENTER FOR ENERGY ECONOMICS & POLICY, 
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Macondo well blew out, killing 11 men and “spewing millions of barrels 
of oil into the Gulf.”52 The BP Deepwater Horizon oil spill was the largest 
blowout and spill in United States history, releasing at least “50,000 
barrels a day for three months for a total of at least 205 million gallons 
(4.9 million barrels).”53 The spill was 19 times the size of Exxon Valdez.54 
While significant oil spills are rare, and catastrophes such as the 
Exxon Valdez and Deepwater Horizon are even rarer, the two disasters 
demonstrate the enormous levels of environmental pollution and 
damage that can occur, as well as the difficulties involved with spill 
response and cleanup.55 However, both incidents still fall short of 
demonstrating the potential catastrophe that could ensue if factors from 
both spills were combined: an oil spill caused by an offshore rig 
operating on the Arctic OCS.56 The Exxon Valdez was only a single-
hulled tanker57 and its spill occurred in Alaska’s Prince William Sound, 
well south of the Arctic Chukchi and Beaufort seas and closer to 
available respondents. The Deepwater Horizon spill occurred in the 
temperate waters of the Gulf of Mexico, one of the most ideal offshore 
areas to contain an oil spill in the United States.58 While the Deepwater 
Horizon explosion occurred at depths much deeper than projected 
drilling sites in the Chukchi and Beaufort,59 the extreme conditions of 
 
DEEPWATER DRILLING: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR A SAFER FUTURE 1 (2011), available at 
http://www.rff.org/centers/energy_economics_and_policy/Documents/Deep
water_Reccomendations.pdf (describing a pre-Deepwater Horizon risk assessment 
of the Macondo well that estimated that the largest likely spill would be only 
4,600 barrels of oil, compared with the actual release of nearly 5 million barrels). 
 52.  Campbell Robertson & John Schwartz, How a Gulf Settlement that BP 
Once Hailed Became Its Target, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 26, 2014), http:// 
www.nytimes.com/2014/04/27/us/how-a-gulf-settlement-that-bp-once-hailed-
became-its-target.html. 
 53.  THE PEW ENVIRONMENT GROUP, supra note 7, at 2. 
 54.  KRUPNICK ET AL., supra note 30, at 4. 
 55.  See Leslie Holland-Bartels & Brenda Pierce, Framing the Assignment and 
Process, in USGS, CIRCULAR, supra note 5, at 1, 3 (noting that numerous federal, 
state, and local regional communities, organizations, and agencies have a hand 
in spill response). 
 56.  See KRUPNICK ET AL., supra note 30, at 26 (“Damages . . . depend on 
factors such as distance to shoreline and water surface, water temperature, 
climate, spill volume, as well as the type and number of living things, property, 
and economic activity risk.”). 
 57.  Oil Plagues Sound 20 Years After, supra note 47. 
 58.  See THE PEW ENVIRONMENT GROUP, supra note 7, at 2 (“The Gulf of 
Mexico—with its temperate waters, proximity to large population centers and 
ready access to necessary infrastructure and response resources—has some of 
the best conditions in the United States for offshore spill response. Yet even with 
these advantages, the spill response was woefully inadequate.”). 
 59. See Rig Data: Deepwater Horizon, RIGZONE, https://www. 
rigzone.com/data/rig_detail.asp?rig_id=153 (last visited Sept. 13, 2014) 
(showing that the Deepwater Horizon drill was drilling 4,992 feet underwater); 
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Arctic Alaska could make adequate response efforts incredibly 
challenging, if not impossible. Additionally, the remote location60 and 
unpredictable effects of climate change create added difficulties and 
unknowns to oil development in the region.61 While speculating on the 
size and environmental impact of an Arctic drilling disaster is an 
exercise in conjecture, it is evident that a disaster even smaller than the 
Exxon Valdez could have catastrophic consequences.62 As a result, oil 
drill operators must take the utmost precautions and operate with the 
best available spill response and containment technologies, or 
alternatively be forced to pay for the consequences. 
E. Lacking The Necessary Infrastructure 
Currently, the remoteness of the Alaskan Arctic OCS, its small 
resident population, and its limited community infrastructure would 
reduce the likelihood for an early community response after a spill, as 
was seen after both Deepwater Horizon and the Exxon Valdez spills.63 After 
the Deepwater Horizon spill, local citizen engagement was vital to early 
spill response,64 and such a response would be infeasible in the sparsely 
populated Alaskan Arctic.65 Due to the harsh environment, it is 
untenable to assume that sufficient community interest could act to 
combat an oil spill, or that the local communities would have the 
resources, including the human capital, to do so. Furthermore, it would 
likely be prohibitively expensive for the United States or Alaska to 
develop the necessary spill response infrastructure in the frontier 
 
USGS APPRAISAL, supra note 1 (showing that the majority of undiscovered 
hydrocarbons are offshore under 500 feet of water); RESOURCES FOR THE FUTURE, 
CENTER FOR ENERGY ECONOMICS & POLICY, supra note 51, at 1 (“In the Gulf of 
Mexico, the probability of a company-reported incident (such as fire damage, 
injuries, or pollution) increases significantly with water depth.”). However, it is 
important to note that the Resources for the Future accident probability study only 
accounts for reported accidents in the Gulf of Mexico, and does not isolate 
pollution from other types of company-reported incidents. Id. 
 60.  THE PEW ENVIRONMENT GROUP, supra note 7, at 3 (“The Arctic Ocean’s 
coastal villages are remote, with no connecting roads. No airports or ports along 
the coast are capable of supporting the influx of equipment and personnel that 
would be required to respond to a catastrophic spill.”). 
 61.  Id. at 4. 
 62.  See KRUPNICK ET AL., supra note 30, at 2 (noting that “[t]he types of 
impacts and the magnitude of each [spill] depend on a variety of factors”). 
 63.  See Holland-Bartles & Kolak, supra note 12, at 147 (discussing how the 
lack of infrastructure available on the Arctic OCS would limit the science 
response in terms of data collection as was seen during Deepwater Horizon and 
Exxon Valdez). 
 64.  Id. 
 65.  Id. 
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environment at this point.66 
F. Inadequate Spill Response Technologies and Capabilities 
The first step in minimizing the risk of oil spills is the invention and 
implementation of effective technologies.67 However, the Arctic presents 
special technological challenges due to ice dynamics, extreme cold, and 
limited light in the winter—causing many of the current tools for spill 
response to be nonfunctional during extreme conditions.68 As a result, 
new spill response technology development and testing is necessary to 
ensure that if a spill were to occur, response and cleanup could be 
effective in the Arctic, where even trace amounts of ice can significantly 
reduce the efficiency of mechanical oil recovery.69 However, current 
United States regulations hinder the development and improvement of 
oil-spill-response technology, as the regulating agencies almost never 
grant spill-testing permits in the Arctic.70 While such permits for 
experimentation are granted in Canada and Norway, their nonexistence 
in the United States has led to a decline in permit applications over the 
past ten years.71 This could be counteracted simply by loosening testing 
regulations for oil companies. Additionally, the government could 
commission oil-response studies, although this would likely face a large 
amount of environmentalist backlash. While the United States could, 
and does, study the experiments of other Arctic nations through 
information sharing,72 directly studying the oil spill response techniques 
 
 66.  See UNITED STATES DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, BUREAU OF OCEAN ENERGY 
MGMT., BUDGET JUSTIFICATIONS AND PERFORMANCE INFORMATION, FISCAL YEAR 
2014 (2014) (showing that the Bureau of Ocean Management’s (BOEM) budget is 
not scheduled to significantly increase in the near future). 
 67.  Holland-Bartles & Kolak, supra note 12, at 111. 
 68.  Id. at 130. 
 69.  Id. at 133, 145. 
 70.  See id. at 145 (“A major point regarding the near-term possibilities for 
new field trials with oil revolves around the likelihood of obtaining appropriate 
permits for such experimentation . . . [but] no spills in U.S. waters for 
experimental purposes have been allowed for nearly two decades.”) (internal 
citations omitted). 
 71.  Id.; see also Christina Nunez, What Happens When Oil Spills in the Arctic?, 
NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC (Apr. 23, 2014), http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/ 
energy/2014/04/140423-national-research-council-on-oil-spills-in-arctic/ 
(“[P]ermits to deliberately release oil into U.S. waters for research have become 
harder to obtain in the United States in the past 15 years.”). 
 72.  See id. (“The EPPR Working Group [consisting of Canada, Denmark, 
Greenland, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Russia, and Sweden,] provides a forum in 
which member governments and indigenous peoples work to better prevent, 
prepare for, and respond to environmental threats from discharges of pollution 
from activities which take place in the Arctic.”). 
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in the Alaskan Arctic would have obvious benefits for developing and 
improving spill-response and technological techniques tailored to the 
Arctic environment.73 
Currently, inadequate spill-response technology, coupled with the 
insufficient infrastructure in Arctic Alaska, creates a strong possibility 
that, in the event a large oil spill occurred, the results would be 
disastrous. Due to the enormous expense associated with improving the 
necessary infrastructure and technological improvements, United States 
laws and regulations should incentivize the oil industry to develop the 
research, technology, and infrastructure to ensure that drilling is 
conducted as safely as possible. 
II. CURRENT REGULATORY APPROACHES 
The United States employs a hybrid of statutory and regulatory 
requirements, along with civil liability devices, to regulate the offshore 
oil industry. These requirements employ both prescriptive commands74 
and management-based regulations,75 and are monitored and enforced 
by federal and state agencies including the Bureau of Ocean Energy 
Management (BOEM) and the Bureau of Safety and Environmental 
Enforcement (BSSE).76 
A. Statutes 
The primary piece of legislation governing offshore operations is 
the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (OPA).77 In the event of a spill, OPA 
requires that the responsible party pay all cleanup costs, but limits 
further liability to $75 million for injuries to third parties.78 The statute 
 
 73.  See NORWEGIAN PETROLEUM DIRECTORATE, ENVIRONMENTAL AND CLIMATE 
CONSIDERATIONS IN THE NORWEGIAN PETROLEUM SECTOR 58 (2013) (“The 
environmental effects of any acute oil discharges depend on more factors than 
just the size of the discharge. Among other things, the discharge site, the season, 
wind speed, currents and the efficiency of the emergency preparedness are 
crucial for the scope of damage.”). 
 74.  See discussion infra Part III.C. 
 75.  Id. 
 76.  See Holland-Bartels & Pierce, supra note 55, at 3 (“[T]here are multiple 
Federal, State, and local and regional communities and organizations that 
influence the ultimate decision outcome, each of which has downstream 
responsibilities in the oil and gas leasing process and can have differing views of 
what science information is essential.”); Clow et al., supra note 5, at 3 (“The 
public also provides input during the Federal leasing process at many points. In 
the larger public policy arena, public opinion also influences both the political 
domain and the use of litigation tools.”). 
 77.  33 U.S.C. § 2701–61 (2012). 
 78.  § 2704(a)(3) (demonstrating that for an offshore facility the responsible 
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further provides for the channeling79 of strict liability—up to the $75 
million cap—toward specific parties;80 a requirement to prove financial 
responsibility of at least $35 million;81 and a $1 billion Oil Spill Liability 
Trust Fund created by per-barrel taxes on oil to cover environmental 
and private damages if a polluter is unwilling or unable to pay,82 or 
should damages exceed the $75 million cap.83 
OPA’s channeling and strict liability create an efficient system that 
reduces the number of determinations a court needs to make84 and eases 
the litigation process for claimants.85 While these mechanisms provide 
for a relatively seamless system of claims under the OPA, the $75 million 
cap is an insufficient amount to cover the environmental and private 
damages that can result from a spill.86 However, there are exemptions to 
the cap. If a spill was caused by “gross negligence or willful misconduct 
 
party is only accountable for damages up to $75,000,000 plus removal costs); see 
also § 2701(31) (“[R]emoval costs [are] the cost[s] of removal that are incurred 
after discharge of oil has occurred or, in any case in which there is a substantial 
threat of a discharge of oil, the costs to prevent, minimize, or mitigate oil 
pollution from such an incident.”). 
 79.  See MARK A. COHEN ET AL., RESOURCES FOR THE FUTURE, DEEPWATER 
DRILLING: LAW, POLICY, AND ECONOMICS OF FIRM ORGANIZATION AND SAFETY 28 
(2011), available at http://www.rff.org/documents/RFF-DP-10-65.pdf 
(“Channeling is the identification, before litigation, of a particular party that will 
be the defendant in an action to recover spill-related damages . . . . [The] OPA [] 
makes the holder of the drilling permit the responsible party for spills from 
offshore platforms.”). 
 80.  See NATHAN RICHARDSON, RESOURCES FOR THE FUTURE, DEEPWATER 
HORIZON AND THE PATCHWORK OF OIL SPILL LIABILITY LAW 2 (2010) (showing that 
strict liability and channeling simplifies litigation as it is not necessary for courts 
to determine which party caused the spill). 
 81.  33 U.S.C. § 2716(c)(1)(A) (2012). Evidence of $35,000,000 in financial 
responsibility is necessary for offshore facilities located seaward of the seaward 
boundary of a state, § 2716(c)(1)(B)(i)., however, the President has the power to 
increase the level of financial responsibility up to $150,000,000, § 2716(c)(1)(C). 
Financial responsibility may be established by: evidence of insurance, surety 
bond, guarantee, letter of credit, qualification as self-insurer, or other evidence of 
financial responsibility. § 2716(e). In Alaska, the dollar amounts required to 
demonstrate financial responsibility changes every third year on October 1st 
based on the Consumer Price Index. ALASKA STAT. § 46.04.045 (2012). 
 82.  See 33 U.S.C. § 2712(a)(1) (2012) (establishing that the Oil Spill Liability 
Trust Fund is to be used for “the payment of removal costs”); NICHOLAS LORIS ET 
AL., HERITAGE FOUNDATION, OIL SPILL LIABILITY: A PLAN FOR REFORM 2 (2010), 
available at http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2010/08/oil-spill-
liability-a-plan-for-reform (“The [Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund] is financed by an 
eight-cent-per-barrel tax on imported and domestic oil.”). 
 83.  RICHARDSON, supra note 80, at 3. 
 84.  Id. at 5. 
 85.  Strict liability also reduces a claimant’s legal costs as the plaintiff need 
not show the defendant was negligent, only that they suffered some economic 
loss caused by the operator’s spill. COHEN ET AL., supra note 79, at 28. 
 86.  See discussion infra Part III.A. 
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or by violation of federal regulations,” there is no liability cap.87 For 
example, after the Exxon Valdez spill, “the federal government sought 
recovery of natural resource damages . . . by filing criminal charges 
under the Migratory Bird Treaty Act (because the spill caused the death 
of protected birds) and the Refuse Act (because the spill dumped 
“refuse” into the navigable waters of the United States).”88 Exxon 
reached a $100 million settlement agreement for restitution damages 
payable to the federal and state government.89 Similarly, many plaintiffs 
that brought claims against BP in the aftermath of Deepwater Horizon 
have done so under the Clean Water Act (CWA),90 which allows 
penalties up to $1,100 per barrel, and up to $4,300 per barrel in the case 
of gross negligence or willful misconduct.91 Furthermore, plaintiffs may 
be allowed to bring claims in state courts, as OPA does not preempt 
state laws governing oil spill liability and compensation.92 
While these complementary or alternative statutes may allow 
plaintiffs to bring claims that greatly exceed the $75 million cap,93 they 
may still not completely compensate aggrieved parties. Further, these 
other statutes generally do not include the efficiency of the channeled 
strict liability of OPA, resulting in drawn-out litigation.94 
 
 87.  33 U.S.C. § 2704(c)(1) (2012) (stopping short of limiting liability for 
instances of “(A) gross negligence or willful misconduct of, or (B) the violation 
of an applicable Federal safety, construction, or operating regulation by, the 
responsible party, an agent or employee of the responsible party, or a person 
acting pursuant to a contractual relationship with the responsible party”). 
 88.  RICHARDSON, supra note 80, at 4. 
 89.  Settlement, EXXON VALDEZ OIL SPILL TRUSTEE COUNCIL, http:// 
www.evostc.state.ak.us/index.cfm?FA=facts.settlement (last visited Oct. 2, 
2014). This figure does not include the hundreds of millions in Exxon’s civil 
settlement and tens of millions involved in Exxon’s criminal plea agreement. Id. 
 90.  Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86 Stat. 816. 
 91.  Id.; see KRUPNICK ET AL., supra note 30, at 44 (“For the BP Gulf oil spill, 
this could amount to $5 billion or $20 billion in fines.”). 
 92.  RICHARDSON, supra note 80, at 4; see, e.g., ALASKA STAT. §§ 46.04.010, 
46.04.020 (2012) (demonstrating that Alaska can, under state law, bring 
unlimited claims for reimbursement for removal and cleanup expenses incurred 
as a result of oil operations). However, the Alaska statute does not appear to 
speak in regards to private claims. 
 93.  See, e.g., KRUPNICK ET AL., supra note 30, at 44 (showing that BP may face 
more than $20 billion in fines under the Clean Water Act). 
 94.  See, e.g., Kiley Kroh, 25 Years After Exxon Valdez Oil Spill, Company Still 
Hasn’t Paid For Long-Term Environmental Damages, CLIMATE PROGRESS (July 15, 
2013), http://thinkprogress.org/climate/2013/07/15/2301451/25-years-after-
exxon-valdez-oil-spill-company-still-hasnt-paid-for-long-term-environmental-
damages/. The original 1991 Exxon Valdez civil settlement contained a ‘reopener 
window’ during which the governments could make a claim for up to an 
additional $100 million for expenses related to the restoration of resources 
damaged by the spill. Id. In 2006 the Federal government and State of Alaska 
exercised this option claiming an additional $92 million needed for cleanup, but 
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B. Agencies 
In the wake of the Deepwater Horizon disaster, and responding to 
allegations of agency capture, the regulatory agency responsible for 
policing offshore drilling was divided into two agencies: the Bureau of 
Ocean Energy Management (BOEM) and the Bureau of Safety and 
Environmental Enforcement (BSEE).95 The creation of two independent 
regulatory agencies separated many of the functions that had been 
considered conflicts of interest under the previous agency, the Minerals 
Management Service (MMS), later renamed the Bureau of Ocean Energy 
Management, Regulation and Enforcement (BOEMRE). The division of 
BOEM and BSEE allows for “greater independence, more budgetary 
autonomy and clearer senior leadership focus” for both engineers and 
inspectors.96 Furthermore, the structures of both new agencies 
“[s]trengthens the role of environmental review and analysis.”97 As it 
now stands, BOEM is responsible for managing environmentally and 
economically responsible development of the nation’s offshore 
resources,98 while BSEE is responsible for the oversight and regulation of 
safety and environmental protection.99 
The creation of two independent agencies, paired with various 
 
Exxon has yet to pay. Id.; see also Mica Rosenberg, Analysis: BP’s U.S. Gulf Oil 
Spill Settlement Challenges May Backfire, REUTERS (Jan. 15, 2014), http:// 
www.reuters.com/article/2014/01/15/us-bp-settlement-analysis-
idUSBREA0E16820140115 (showing that BP has begun to challenge many of the 
claims filed against it after Deepwater Horizon). 
 95.  Press Release, Dep’t of the Interior, Salazar Receives Implementation 
Plan for Restructuring the Department’s Offshore Energy Missions, (July 9, 
2010), available at http://www.doi.gov/news/pressreleases/Salazar-Receives-
Implementation-Plan-for-Restructuring-the-Departments-Offshore-Energy-
missions.cfm (“The reform and reorganization is based on the premise that the 
missions formerly carried out by the Minerals Management Service must be 
clearly defined and distinct from each other. In short, we must eliminate real 
and perceived conflicts within the organization.”). A third agency was also 
created; the Office of Natural Resources Revenue is now responsible for the 
function of revenue collection and resides under the jurisdiction of the 
Department of Interior’s Office of Policy, Management and Budget. The 
Reorganization of the Former MMS, BUREAU OF OCEAN ENERGY MGMT., http:// 
www.boem.gov/About-BOEM/Reorganization/Reorganization.aspx (last 
visited Nov. 9, 2014). 
 96.  The Reorganization of the Former MMS, supra note 101. 
 97.  Id. 
 98.  Fact Sheet: The BSEE and BOEM Separation, DEP’T OF INTERIOR 1 (Jan. 19, 
2011), http://www.doi.gov/news/pressreleases/upload/01-19-11_Fact-Sheet-
BSEE-BOEM-separation-2.pdf. (“Functions [of BSEE] will include: All field 
operations including Permitting and Research, Inspections, Offshore Regulatory 
Programs, Oil Spill Response, and newly formed Training and Environmental 
Compliance functions.”). 
 99.  Id. 
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initiatives such as Implementation Teams and a new recusal policy to 
help employees deal with conflicts of interest,100 has increased 
confidence in the government’s ability to properly regulate the offshore 
oil industry.101 However, the agencies responsible for regulating 
offshore drilling are still plagued with many of the same issues that 
previously existed, such as insufficient financing, under-staffing, and the 
inability to recruit qualified staff.102 Due to funding restrictions, it is 
unlikely that these agencies will be able to hire the number of qualified 
individuals necessary to properly inspect and regulate the oil industry, 
which can pay top dollar for the best engineering talent.103 Because 
government agencies simply do not have the resources to adequately 
regulate the offshore oil industry, it is necessary that regulations 
incentivize the oil industry to operate in the safest manner possible by 
forcing them to pay the price when something goes wrong. 
C. Regulatory Schemes 
While there are numerous regulatory approaches to offshore 
drilling, most of these tools are parts within larger regulatory schemes. 
The current regulatory regime in the United States integrates command-
and-control (prescriptive) regulations, inspections and fines,104 strict 
liability on damages (up to a cap of $75 million),105 and management-
based regulations—which were added in the aftermath of Deepwater 
Horizon.106 
1. Command and Control Technical Standards 
 
The Deepwater Horizon accident at the Macondo well on April 20, 
 
 100.  Statement of Michael R. Bromwich, BUREAU OF SAFETY AND ENV’T 
ENFORCEMENT 1, 5 (Sept. 15, 2011), http://www.bsee.gov/uploadedFiles/BSEE/ 
Newsroom/Congressional_Testimony/MRBtestimony110915.pdf. 
 101.  ST Conference Preview, NOIA 2013 Annual Meeting Review, SEA TECH. 
MAGAZINE, http://www.sea-technology.com/features/2013/0613/5_NOIA13 
_Review.php (last visited May 16, 2014). 
 102.  John M. Broder & Clifford Krauss, Regulation of Offshore Rigs is a Work in 
Progress, N.Y. TIMES (April 17, 2011), available at http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2011/04/17/us/politics/17regulate.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0. 
 103.  See id. (noting that oil companies in some cases pay twice the 
government salary for their petroleum engineers). 
 104.  See discussion infra Part III.C. 
 105.  33 U.S.C. § 2704(a)(3) (2012). 
 106.  Lori S. Bennear, Beyond Belts and Suspenders, Promoting Private Risk 
Management in Offshore Drilling 1 (Duke Env’t Econ. Working Paper Series, 
Working Paper EE 11-11, 2011), available at http://sites.nicholasinstitute.duke 
.edu/environmentaleconomics/files/2013/01/WP-EE-11-11.pdf. 
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2010 was the result of multiple safety-system failures. The explosion, 
and subsequent oil spill that occurred, resulted from a perfect storm of 
what could go wrong. “The key failure at the Macondo well was that the 
cement job failed to properly seal the hydrocarbons from the well.”107 
This was caused by disagreements about the design of the production 
casing, disagreements over how many centralizers were necessary to 
keep the casing centered in the well, and arguments over the makeup of 
the cement slurry.108 While these decisions contributed to the initial 
leakage, there were a number of safety systems in place that should have 
recognized the leakage, and prevented the explosion and subsequent 
spill.109 Further, the blowout preventer (BOP) should have been 
activated first manually, and if that failed, by a deadman system. 
Neither system activated the sheer rams in this instance, which would 
have closed the well and blocked the massive oil spill that ensued.110 
Before the Deepwater Horizon disaster, the United States’ oil 
industry was regulated by a set of “highly prescriptive command-and-
control regulations requiring significant redundancy in safety 
systems,”111 coupled with the current $75 million strict liability regime 
against the operator.112 Additional damages were covered by the $1 
billion supplemental fund.113 In theory, this combination was thought to 
prescribe the proper technical specifications, while also providing the oil 
companies the incentive to manage risk.114 The redundant technologies 
were intended to prevent an accident if one or more technical or human 
errors should occur.115 However, while these multi-safety mandates 
sound good on paper, insufficient government oversight may have 
incentivized industry managers to cut corners when implementing 
safety procedures because the chance of a major accident is slight. More 
importantly, even if these prescriptive safety-devices are in place, they 
 
 107.  Id. at 5 
 108.  Id. at 6. 
 109.  Id. at 7. 
 110.  Id. at 4–8. A full description of elements that led to the Deepwater 
Horizon disaster are beyond the scope of this Note but can be found elsewhere. 
E.g., Investigative Report — Island Operating Company, UNITED STATES DEP’T OF THE 
INTERIOR, (May 24, 2010), http://www.govexec.com/pdfs/052510ts1.pdf. 
 111.  Bennear, supra note 106, at 2. 
 112.  33 U.S.C. § 2704(a)(3) (2012). 
 113.  § 2712(a)(1); Testimony of National Pollution Funds Center Director Craig A. 
Bennett, UNITED STATES DEP’T OF HOMELAND SECURITY (Dec. 6, 2011), 
http://www.dhs.gov/news/2011/12/06/testimony-craig-bennett-director-
national-pollution-funds-center-house-committee (discussing the supplemental 
Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund). 
 114.  Bennear, supra note 106, at 2–3. 
 115.  Id. at 9–10. 
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are certainly not foolproof.116 
2. Risk Management Plans / Management Based Regulation 
 
While specific technical regulations are encouraged and still 
required,117 the United States shifted to a more management-based 
regulatory (MBR) approach in the wake of Deepwater Horizon: “MBR 
does not mandate specific means to achieving regulatory ends, but 
instead mandates that firms engage in systematic planning efforts 
designed to better achieve the regulatory end.”118 Through such a 
scheme, many activities are left unregulated, incentivizing the industry 
to operate safely in order to avoid fines and penalties associated with 
environmentally detrimental activities.119 Many other countries—
including the United Kingdom, Norway, and Canada—regulate offshore 
drilling through MBRs using safety regulations with similar basic 
requirements (prescriptive commands) that each drilling facility 
installation must provide. For example, in the United Kingdom each 
drilling installation must provide the following: 
 Basic narrative description of the ways in which the 
installation was designed and will be operated to minimize 
risk. 
 Descriptions and diagrams of the installation and all 
connections and wells that are planned for the installation. 
 Information on the meteorological and oceanographic 
conditions as well as geologic conditions of the seabed. 
 Descriptions of the types of operations and the number of 
people onboard the installation. 
 Description of methods to control pressure, prevent leaks and 
blowouts, and minimize the effects on the subsea beds. 
 A description of any pipeline capable of causing an accident 
with information on the dimensions and layout, the 
 
 116.  See discussion infra Part III.A. (describing what went wrong at the 
Macondo well). 
 117.  Fact Sheet: The Drilling Safety Rule, BUREAU OF OCEAN ENERGY MGMT., 
REGULATION AND ENFORCEMENT 1–2, http://www.doi.gov/news/pressreleases/ 
upload/093010_fact-sheet_drilling-safety-rule.pdf (listing requirements for 
various practices to isolate potential flows during well construction). 
 118.  Bennear, supra note 106, at 13. 
 119.  There are numerous types of policies that can be considered 
“management-based,” such as: “firms must review their production process, 
identify alternative production techniques or input mixes that would achieve the 
public goal, evaluate the feasibility of these alternatives and report on these 
evaluations”; “firms must review supply chains and distribution chains 
including all subcontractors, identify changes in all operations that could 
promote the public goal, evaluate the feasibility of these alternatives and report 
on these evaluations”; and “regulated firms must obtain periodic third-party 
review and certification of their management plans and evaluations.” Id. at 12–
14. 
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evacuation plan and location of temporary refuge for workers. 
 A completed risk assessment with respect to pipelines capable 
of causing an accident. 
 Plans for the detection of toxic and flammable gases and plans 
to detect, mitigate and prevent fires.120 
Echoing the United Kingdom’s policies, after Deepwater Horizon the 
United States implemented similar MBRs intended to coexist with both 
pre-existing and newly-added command-and-control regulations.121 
MBRs work well in industries, such as the oil drilling industry, in 
which it is difficult for regulators to notice violations because of low 
accident rates.122 MBRs are particularly well-suited for offshore oil 
regulation because they put the impetus on the oil companies to either 
operate safely or face the risk of penalties if they cause an accident. 
However, under the current United States regulations, there is little to 
ensure that management-based plans are fully implemented, and they 
may not actually drive industry technological improvement.123 One 
cause of this is the low $75 million liability cap for violators.124 
3. New Tools, Same Old Issues 
 
While regulations have become more comprehensive and 
regulatory agencies have improved since the Deepwater Horizon spill, 
industry regulation still suffers from a number of shortcomings. The 
regulatory agencies simply do not have the resources, manpower, or 
expertise to adequately monitor the behemoth offshore drilling 
industry.125 The United States’ shift toward an MBR system curbs much 
of the need for a comprehensive regulatory enforcement agency, as it 
places larger incentives on operators to undertake their own safety 
planning. However, the underlying issue remains: the penalties for 
accidents are insufficient to truly incentivize operators to take the 
 
 120.  Id. at 15–16. 
 121.  Id. at 16. 
 122.  Id. at 17; see 30 CFR § 250.401(a) (2014) (requiring operators to “use the 
best available and safest drilling technology to monitor and evaluate well 
conditions”). 
 123.  Bennear, supra note 106, at 3. 
 124.  BOEM has proposed to increase the $75 million cap to $134 million. 
BOEM Publishes Proposed Adjustment to Limit of Liability for Offshore Facilities that 
Cause Oil Spills, BUREAU OF OCEAN ENERGY MGMT., http://www.boem.gov/ 
press02212014/ (last visited May 16, 2014) [hereinafter BOEM Publishes Proposed 
Adjustment]. One hundred thirty-four million dollars in 2014 is roughly seventy-
five million dollars in 1990, adjusted for inflation based on the Consumer Price 
Index. CPI Inflation Calculator, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, 
http://data.bls.gov/cgi-bin/cpicalc.pl?cost1=75%2C000&year1=1990&year2 
=2014 (last visited October 3, 2014). 
 125.  Broder & Krauss, supra note 102. 
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utmost safety precautions, to make environmentally-conscious 
decisions, and to drive technological improvement. It is safe to assume 
that oil industry decision makers are profit-maximizers and will make 
their respective decisions through a cost-benefit analysis examining 
potential safety and environmental considerations, and weighing a 
“safety-focused approach [versus] the expected costs of more aggressive 
decisions.”126 Because OPA sets a liability cap of $75 million,127 operators 
may be incentivized to forego the safest course of action (as long as they 
do not violate another statute). Additionally, the limit on liability may 
stunt industry incentives to develop safer technologies, as operators 
may be more willing to simply pay a fine rather than make efforts to 
avoid one. Developing safety technologies is especially important in the 
Arctic OCS due to the extreme conditions, its remote location, and a lack 
of existing infrastructure available for response in case of an accident.128 
Furthermore, while the limited liability cap may cause operators to 
avoid taking the safest course of action or investing in better 
technologies, it also creates the potential for situations where damaged 
parties may not be fully compensated for their damages (even with the 
supplementary fund of $1 billion).129 Even if claimants are able to 
eliminate an operator’s protection under the cap by demonstrating gross 
negligence or violations under other federal statutes,130 the issue of 
payment remains. Under the OPA, operators may only be required to 
demonstrate financial responsibility of $35 million.131 Even with the $1 
 
 126.  Bennear, supra note 106, at 11 (observing that the expected costs of a 
more conservative safety-based approach may include time spent waiting for 
second opinions, additional analysis, or additional materials and equipment, 
and that the cost of more aggressive decisions are expectations of fines for either 
violations, accidents, or property damage). 
 127.  33 U.S.C. § 2704(a)(3) (2012). 
 128.  See THE PEW ENVIRONMENT GROUP, supra note 7, at 2–4 (detailing that the 
Alaskan Arctic is a harsh and unforgiving environment, characterized by sea ice 
for most of the year, freezing temperatures, months of darkness, extended 
periods of heavy fog, and weeklong storms approaching hurricane strength; and 
furthermore, that the Alaskan Arctic’s remote location is sparsely populated and 
the necessary infrastructure needed in the case of an accident is virtually non-
existent). 
 129.  For example, spill damages could greatly exceed a firm’s ability to pay 
out even with the additional security blanket of the $1 billion supplementary 
fund. Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund, 26 U.S.C. § 9509 (2012) (establishing the $1 
billion trust fund). 
 130.  See 33 U.S.C. § 2704(c)(1) (2012) (explaining that liability is not limited in 
instances of “(A) gross negligence or willful misconduct of, or (B) the violation 
of an applicable Federal safety, construction, or operating regulation by, the 
responsible party, an agent or employee of the responsible party, or a person 
acting pursuant to a contractual relationship with the responsible party”). 
 131.  § 2716(c)(1)(B)(i). This amount may be increased to $150 million if a 
facility’s estimated worst-case discharge volume exceeds 105,000 barrels. See Oil 
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billion supplementary fund, such a low level of financial responsibility 
could prove highly troublesome in the instance of a major accident or 
insolvent operator132—resulting in damaged parties or federal and state 
governments being left to clean up an operator’s mess and pay the bill. 
III. RECOMMENDED REGULATORY APPROACH 
The United States’ current regulatory scheme does not properly 
incentivize operators to invest in improved safety and response 
technologies, nor does it ensure that injured third parties are adequately 
compensated.133 While there are a number of regulatory changes that 
could incentivize the industry to operate safer and invest in 
technological improvements, it is first necessary to increase the existing 
limited liability of operators in order to properly align industry safety 
incentives with the risk of operation. It is also necessary for the United 
States to create an adequate payment scheme to compensate innocent 
victims in the event that an operator cannot pay. To accomplish these 
goals, the United States should adopt a regulatory regime that: (1) 
significantly increases the liability cap; (2) requires increased financial 
responsibility in the form of an upfront deposit-bond or third-party 
insurance; (3) establishes a risk-based premium fund; and (4) creates a 
supplementary fund made up of contributions from firms that produce 
above a specified level. These proposals are interconnected and 
compliment each other to form a comprehensive regime to incentivize 
industrial investments in safety and technological improvements, and to 
ensure that damaged third parties are more adequately compensated. 
A. Increase The Limited Liability Cap 
Strict liability creates an efficient and cost-effective system because 
plaintiffs only need to prove that they suffered damage as a result of the 
defendant’s conduct, rather than defendant’s negligence.134 “Strict 
liability therefore has the advantage of greatly simplifying litigation and 
 
Spill Financial Responsibility for Offshore Facilities, 63 Fed. Reg. 42,699, 42,714 (to be 
codified at 30 C.F.R. pts. 250 & 253). However, “firms with more than one facility 
need to show financial responsibility for only the facility with the highest 
requirement. A firm with 10 offshore drilling platforms, for example, must 
demonstrate only $35 million, not $350 million.” COHEN ET AL., supra note 79, at 
n.23 (emphasis added). 
 132.  See KRUPNIK, ET. AL, supra note 30, at 38 (noting a firm may declare 
bankruptcy or have inadequate resources to fully absorb the damages it is 
responsible for under the law). 
 133.  See discussion infra Part III.D. 
 134.  COHEN ET AL., supra note 79, at 28. 
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the cost to the government in particular.”135 However, it is hard to 
defend OPA’s strict liability cap of only $75 million.136 It is almost 
universally accepted that the cap is insufficient to cover the potential 
third party damages caused by a large spill.137 Recently, the United 
States Department of Interior proposed raising the strict liability cap to 
$134 million.138 However, this proposed cap merely keeps with 
inflation,139 and would be insufficient to cover the damages created by a 
large spill in the Alaskan Arctic.140 While some have called for the 
removal of the cap and to install unlimited strict liability for operators,141 
an unlimited cap would be unadvisable, as it would deter industry 
activity in the Arctic and make it nearly impossible for some operators 
to find insurance.142 As a result, an unlimited cap could lead to a de facto 
moratorium on offshore activities.143 
 However, while unlimited liability may be untenable, and even 
undesirable, the United States should still raise its liability cap to a level 
 
 135.  Id. at 29. 
 136.  Nathan Richardson, Presentation at Duke University Energy Initiative’s 
Panel on Arctic Oil/Gas Drilling: Lessons from the Past and Implications for the 
Future (Apr. 25, 2014). 
 137.  Id.; see also LORIS ET AL., supra note 82 (“Nearly everyone agrees that the 
cap is too low . . . .”); Jennifer Larino, Obama Administration to Raise Oil Spill 
Liability Cap, THE TIMES-PICAYUNE (Feb 21, 2014), http://www.nola.com/ 
business/index.ssf/2014/02/obama_administration_set_to_ra.html (describing 
how, in 2010, Senators Bill Nelson, Robert Menendez, and the late Frank 
Lautenberg introduced a bill that would have increased the liability cap to $10 
billion, but it was shot down as opposition argued that such a sharp increase 
would decrease oil and gas exploration investment). 
 138.  BOEM Publishes Proposed Adjustment, supra note 124. 
 139.  Id. 
 140.  See discussion supra Part I.D. (describing the massive amounts of 
environmental damages from both the Exxon Valdez spill, which spilled 11 
million barrels, and Deepwater Horizon oil spill, which spilled 4.9 million 
barrels—both of which resulted in billions of dollars in damages). 
 141.  See Mark A. Cohen, Professor at Vanderbilt University, Presentation at 
Duke University Energy Initiative’s Panel on Arctic Oil/Gas Drilling: Lessons 
from the Past and Implications for the Future: Law, Policy & Incentives for Firms 
to Reduce Risk of Spills (Apr. 25, 2014) [hereinafter Cohen, Presentation at Duke 
University] (“As an economist, if you have unlimited liability then you’re done, 
but that’s not politically reasonable.”) 
 142.  See id.; Michael Faure, Maastricht University, Comment at Duke 
University Energy Initiative’s Panel on Arctic Oil/Gas Drilling: Lessons from the 
Past and Implications for the Future: U.S. Offshore Spill Liability (Apr. 25, 2014) 
(“The price [the public] pay[s] for strict liability, is capped liability.”) 
 143.  One could certainly argue that until sufficient spill response technology 
is developed, the United States should implement an unlimited liability scheme 
that is specific to the Arctic. However, this may have the effect of causing even 
the largest energy companies to forego Arctic offshore drilling and instead focus 
on alternative energy sources. 
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on par with its offshore drilling international peers.144 Under the 
Offshore Pollution Liability Agreement (OPOL), the United Kingdom 
imposes strict liability up to a cap of $250 million.145 Canada has recently 
proposed raising its strict liability cap from $40 million to $1 billion.146 
Raising the cap to at least $1 billion,147 and subsequently raising a firm’s 
financial responsibility requirement,148 would provide a greater safety 
net for those damaged and would not unduly burden oil companies. 
Furthermore, boosting the amount for which a firm can be strictly liable 
by $925 million should provide a greater incentive for operators to 
conduct operations in a safer manner and invest in prevention and 
response technologies. The cost of raising the cap may, however, be 
transferred to the public via higher prices, and would likely make it 
infeasible for some non-major operators to enter the Arctic.149 
While increasing the amount of strict liability is a productive first 
step in inducing operators to increase safety and in ensuring that injured 
 
 144.  Mark A. Cohen suggests that the liability cap should be set for each 
individual well—set at an amount equal to the calculated worst-case scenario 
cost. Cohen, Presentation at Duke University, supra note 141. While interesting 
and certainly possible, such a scheme has the potential for a number of issues 
such as over- or under-valuing. For example, estimating the potential damage of 
a spill beforehand could grossly underestimate the damages (and coverage). 
This is currently one of the issues with OPA’s financial responsibility 
requirement that sets a firm’s financial responsibility at between $35 million and 
$150 million based on potential estimated damages. 33 U.S.C. § 2716(c) (2012). 
Further, valuing each well individually could create a prohibitive system where 
industry would avoid certain wells due to the enormous strict liability caps 
attached. The former point would be of a particular concern in the Arctic as it is 
almost impossible to accurately estimate spill damages at this juncture. See 
generally Holland-Bartles & Kolak, supra note 12. 
 145.  THE OFFSHORE POLLUTION LIAB. ASS’N LTD., OPOL (2010), available at 
http://www.opol.org.uk/downloads/opol-guidelines-oct10.pdf. 
 146.  Oil Spill Liability and Regulatory Regime: Canada, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, 
http://www.loc.gov/law/help/oil-spill-liability/canada.php (last visited May 
16, 2014). Canada’s Bill C-22, titled “The Energy Safety and Security Act” would 
raise strict liability for offshore drilling to one billion dollars and operators 
would have to demonstrate financial responsibility of one billion dollars. H. 
Commons C-22, 41st Parl., 2d Sess. (Can. 2014), available at 
http://www.parl.gc.ca/HousePublications/Publication.aspx?Language=E&Mo
de=1&DocId=6395896&File=4. 
 147.  This is a theoretical, rather than a hard number, as one billion dollars 
would be manageable for many oil companies and would greatly increase the 
strict liability protection under OPA. 
 148.  Firms only need to demonstrate financial responsibility of $35 million to 
$150 million. 33 U.S.C. § 2716(c) (2012); see also discussion infra Part III.B. 
 149.  See COHEN ET AL., supra note 79, at 2 (“Significantly increasing liability 
caps and financial responsibility may push some non-major oil exploration 
companies out of the Gulf if they were unable to afford liability insurance. These 
effects are likely outweighed by small firms’ failure to fully internalize social 
costs.”). 
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third parties can recover damages, it is also necessary to increase the 
level of required financial security.150 
B. Increase Proof Of Financial Responsibility & Third-Party 
Insurance 
The basic idea of financial responsibility is simple: “to engage in 
activities that expose outside parties to risks, a firm must demonstrate 
that it has sufficient resources—either its own (self-insurance) or third-
party insurance coverage—to compensate injured parties in the event of 
an accident.”151 In principle, the financial requirement “should be 
sufficiently high to cover the costs of the worst-case spill.”152 Under 
OPA, firms are only required to demonstrate financial responsibility of 
between $35 million and $150 million, depending on the size of potential 
worst-case discharge volume.153 As OPA currently has a strict liability 
cap of $75 million, it is inconsistent that some operators may be required 
to have only $35 million in financial responsibility, as those operators 
may be unable to cover the liability they are legally obligated to if a spill 
causes significant damage.154 At a minimum, firms should be required to 
demonstrate financial responsibility up to the adjusted cap ($1 billion, as 
suggested above). In theory, simply increasing the responsibility 
requirement should increase firms’ incentives to operate in a safer 
manner, as they are putting more resources on the line. However, two 
financial responsibility instruments—(1) an upfront deposit-refund 
system and (2) third-party insurance—each provide additional 
incentives for operators to invest in safety in addition to providing 




 150.  See id. (“Liability caps . . . are particularly effective when complemented 
by financial responsibility requirement or third-party insurance; raising liability 
caps without raising financial responsibility requirements or requiring insurance 
would have little effect on safety culture at small firms that would declare 
bankruptcy because of an inability to pay damages.”). 
 151.  Id. at 32. 
 152.  Id. 
 153.  33 U.S.C. § 2716(c) (2012). 
 154.  For example, if a firm is required to have only $35 million in financial 
responsibility, but is strictly liable for $60 million in damages in the instance of a 
spill and goes bankrupt, the firm may be unable to adequately compensate the 
damages it is responsible for under OPA. In such an instance, the liability cap is 
effectively reduced to the amount of financial responsibility. 
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1. Deposit-Refund (Bond) 
 
A deposit-refund device, or bond, is a system in which “the 
regulated entity (consumer, firm, etc.) pays an upfront deposit that is 
refunded, if and only if, the entity follows through on required 
actions.”155 The deposit-bond system “is frequently used when there are 
many regulated entities, so enforcement of standards is expensive and 
when costs of mitigating damage are high . . . . For economic efficiency 
the deposit is set equal to the marginal social costs of improper 
disposal.”156 
If such a system were implemented for offshore drilling it would 
“involve an upfront ‘security deposit’ for all well operations”157 which 
would be refunded upon drilling completion and a satisfactory safety 
inspection.158 Operators that consistently receive strong safety scores 
from third party auditors would be rewarded with a discount on future 
security deposits.159 
While the incentives created by an upfront deposit are similar in 
theory to the incentives provided by strict liability, behavioral 
economics suggest that “shifting payment upfront makes safety more 
salient and may result in increased attention to safety even if the 
monetary costs are not changed.”160 Furthermore, paying upfront 
reduces the chance that an operator will be unable to pay for damages 
from securitized collateral that is no longer available.161 The deposit 
refund system provides a further incentive for firms over pure strict 
liability in the sense that it rewards firms with strong safety records by 
reducing future deposit payments, or conversely punishes firms with 
poor performance records by increasing the cost of operation.162 
2. Third-Party Insurance 
 
Under the current financial responsibility requirements, operators 
are not required to have insurance if they can demonstrate financial 
responsibility through other means such as surety bonds, guarantees, 
letters of credit, qualification as a self-insurer, or other evidence of 
 
 155.  Bennear, supra note 106, at 24. 
 156.  Id. (citations omitted). 
 157.  Id. 
 158.  Id. 
 159.  Id. at 25. 
 160.  Id. at 24–25 (discussing behavioral economics studies on cheating). 
 161.  For example, where an operator had securitized some of its equipment 
to prove financial responsibility as required under OPA and that equipment was 
lost in an accident. 
 162.  Bennear, supra note 106, at 25. 
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financial responsibility.163 Most of the major operators have their own 
captive insurance, while smaller operators may have to demonstrate that 
their assets are at least enough to cover expected damages from a spill. 
While it is most important that firms are able to demonstrate financial 
responsibility, insurance from an independent third party adds 
additional incentives for operators to perform safely through adjustable 
premiums and a third-party monitoring role.164 
Third-party insurers can incentivize operator safety by instituting a 
risk-based pricing model where “firms with identifiably higher risk 
exposures pay higher rates (creating an incentive to reduce risk).”165 The 
insurer would undertake the role of a third-party monitor to assess the 
level of risk—incentivizing firms to increase safety in order to reduce 
their insurance premiums.166 Monitoring by third-party insurance 
agencies is preferable to government monitoring because insurance 
agencies have greater resources to hire more qualified monitors and, 
more importantly, have a stronger incentive to adequately monitor 
operations as they will be responsible for footing the bill in the case of an 
accident.167 
Increasing the strict liability cap (for example, to the proposed $1 
billion above) would further incentivize third-party insurers to conduct 
more comprehensive monitoring.168 As governmental oversight capacity 
of offshore regulation is not likely to increase in the near future,169 third-
party oversight capacity and monitoring may result in a more effective 
monitoring system than purely governmental oversight.170 
Moreover, while both the deposit-refund system and mandating 
third-party insurance add additional incentives for industry to operate 
safely through “rewards” for safe operations (lower bond deposits or 
lower insurance premiums), the additional third-party monitoring 
aspect of third-party insurance creates a greater incentive than the mere 
psychological motivation of having “paid up-front.” Therefore, the 
United States should mandate third-party insurance instead of a 
deposit-refund system or the existing flexible “financial responsibility 
 
 163.  33 U.S.C. § 2716(e) (2012). 
 164.  See COHEN ET AL., supra note 79, at 36. 
 165.  Id. 
 166.  Id. 
 167.  Id. at 36–37; see also Broder & Krauss, supra note 102 (noting oil 
companies in some cases pay twice the government salary for their petroleum 
engineers). 
 168.  COHEN ET AL., supra note 79, at 37 (observing that if liability is high for 
operators, this should incentivize insurers to effectively monitor their clients). 
 169.  BOEM Publishes Proposed Adjustment, supra note 124. 
 170.  COHEN ET AL., supra note 79, at 37. 
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requirement.”171 The instituted third-party insurance requirement 
should be at least equal to the strict liability cap. While this may make it 
nearly impossible for some non-major firms to enter the Arctic, it is the 
best course of action due to the extreme Arctic environment that makes 
spill response and cleanup incredibly difficult. These challenges could 
contribute to enormous damages—which major firms can more readily 
compensate.172 
C. Establish A Risk-Based Premium Fund 
The current Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund under OPA provides an 
additional $1 billion to cover additional damages that an operator is not 
legally required to pay, or is unable to pay.173 The current fund is 
maintained by an eight-cent-per-barrel tax on imported and domestic 
oil.174 Such a fund structure can create a “classic moral hazard problem 
in which . . . there is a stronger incentive to (1) adopt a weaker safety 
culture and (2) drill wells that the firm knows, ex ante, are riskier.”175 The 
fund exasperates this problem because firms are equally protected 
under the blanket of the fund, despite varying levels of operational 
safety and preparedness. A way to incentivize firms to adopt a stronger 
safety culture and “simultaneously address the perverse incentives 
created by an insurance pool” is to impose “risk-based drilling fees,” 
requiring a firm to pay premiums into the fund based on “the number of 
wells and the safety score at each operation.”176 Government regulators, 
 
 171.  See 33 U.S.C. § 2716(e) (2012) (“Financial responsibility . . . may be 
established by . . . evidence of insurance, surety bond, guarantee, letter of credit, 
qualification as a self-insurer, or other evidence of financial responsibility.”). 
 172.  See Compensating the People and Communities Affected, BP, http:// 
www.bp.com/en/global/corporate/gulf-of-mexico-restoration/deepwater-
horizon-accident-and-response/compensating-the-people-and-communities-
affected.html (last visited Oct. 27, 2014) (describing a $20 billion trust fund 
voluntarily set up by BP to satisfy claims related to the Deepwater Horizon spill). 
 173. 26 U.S.C. § 9509 (2012). 
 174.  LORIS ET AL., supra note 82. 
 175.  COHEN ET AL., supra note 79, at 38. 
 176.  Id. Alternatively, the Price-Anderson Act provides no-fault insurance in 
the instance of a nuclear accident. See Insurance: Price-Anderson Act Provides 
Effective Liability Insurance at No Cost to the Public, NUCLEAR ENERGY INST. (2014), 
http://www.nei.org/Master-Document-Folder/Backgrounders/Fact-Sheets/ 
Insurance-Price-Anderson-Act-Provides-Effective-Li. Power reactor licensees are 
required to obtain the maximum amount of insurance available in the insurance 
market ($375 million per plant as of 2012). Id. This individual insurance acts as a 
first tier of protection. The second tier of insurance protection is the Price-
Anderson fund, which functions as a shared pool of protection financed by the 
reactor companies to be used in the instance of an accident causing more than 
$375 million in damages. Id. As of 2013, the maximum amount of the fund is 
approximately $12.61 billion ($121,255,000 X 104 reactors). Id. While the Price-
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insurance companies, or industry organizations would rate a firm’s level 
of safety at each well and “the fee would be based on the ex ante 
probability and severity of a spill from each well.”177 Such a risk-based 
premium fund could be effective to incentive firms to adopt a stronger 
safety culture and invest in response technology, as firms would have to 
pay a greater sum for riskier operations178 or would be rewarded for 
investing in safety.179 
D. Supplementary Fund Based On Production Levels 
Increasing the strict liability cap, mandating third party insurance, 
and establishing a risk-based premium fund would work as 
complements with each other to incentivize the industry to invest in 
safety, and would provide additional assurance that damaged third 
parties will receive compensation in the event of a spill.180 However, the 
threat of a large spill such as Exxon Valdez or Deepwater Horizon still 
exists, leaving the potential for third parties to go undercompensated or 
even uncompensated.181 
 
Anderson Act and fund are successful in the nuclear industry due to the 
enormous fund-pool ($12.61 billion), such a successful pool requires intense 
monitoring to ensure that all members of the pool are operating within the 
industry-mandated guidelines. Id. This level of monitoring is currently not 
feasible for the offshore oil industry. See discussion supra Part III.B. 
 177.  COHEN ET AL., supra note 79, at 38–39. The task of measuring risk-based 
fees is beyond the scope of this note. However, “[a]t the outset, it seems 
reasonable to set the fee based on (1) the firm’s past safety record; (2) observable 
characteristics of the well (depth, pressure, etc.); and (3) the adoption of certain 
safety culture policies (such as compensation schemes or promotion criteria that 
reward safety).” Id. at 39. 
 178.  While, increasing the size of the fund would be beneficial in the sense of 
increasing the level of assurance innocent third parties would receive in the 
instance of a spill, developing the approximate size of the fund is beyond the 
scope of this note. Further, the fund would not be a set number, as it would 
fluctuate based on the number of active wells and the safety ratings of the 
respective wells. However, to have its intended effect, the fund should be a 
sizeable amount. The current $1 billion fund could serve as a starting point. 
 179.  Firms would earn a “dual-reward” for safe operational practices as they 
pay less into the risk based premium fund and would also pay a reduced third-
party insurance premium. See discussion supra Part III.B. 
 180.  Under this note’s proposed regime there would be at least $2 billion 
immediately available for damaged third parties in the event of a spill ($1 billion 
in strict liability back by mandatory third-party insurance as financial 
responsibility, plus $1 billion from the risk-based fund). 
 181.  While most large spills will violate multiple federal regulations, thus 
removing OPA’s liability cap and allowing injured parties to bring unlimited 
claims under another statute (e.g., the Clean Water Act), the injured party may 
forego this route or settle for less than their damages to avoid the time and cost 
of a lengthy litigation process against a sophisticated oil firm. See 33 U.S.C. § 
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To add an additional tier of compensation assurance for innocent 
third parties, the United States should implement a second insurance-
pool fund, called the Arctic Supplementary Fund (ASF). This fund 
would be an additional fund, separate from the risk-based premium 
fund described above. The ASF would tax only the largest oil producers, 
identified by the total volume extracted from all Arctic offshore leases in 
a given time period.182 Once a firm reaches an established threshold of 
extraction, the firm would be required to pay a small tax on each 
additional unit of hydrocarbons extracted.183 Extraction undertaken by a 
firm’s subsidiary or subcontractor would count against a firm’s 
extraction total to prevent behaviors aimed at avoiding the tax.184 
The proposal for the Arctic Supplementary Fund is based on the 
International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage 
(CLC) and its “supplementary fund,” which provides compensation for 
oil pollution damage resulting from tanker spills.185 The CLC and its 
supplementary protocols create a system of compulsory strict-liability 
insurance and third-party protection.186 The CLC contains a three-tiered 
system: Tier 1: strict limited liability for a ship owner, capped based on 
the gross tonnage of the ship; Tier 2: a 203 million Special Drawing Right 
(SDR)187 fund financed by contributions levied on states that receive 
more than 150,000 tons of a combination of crude and heavy oil fuel 
within a year;188 and Tier 3: a “supplementary fund” to provide for 
damages not covered by Tiers 1 and 2, that increases the total amount 
 
2704(c)(1) (2012) (allowing unlimited liability in instances of negligence or 
willful misconduct or a relevant federal regulation). 
 182.  For example, one drilling season or year. 
 183.  The tax on additional units of extraction past the threshold should be set 
at a level that would allow firms to continue to extract at cost effective levels 
(i.e., the tax must be set at a level where firms would remain profitable and not 
simply stop extracting once they reached the threshold). 
 184.  For example, if a firm approaching the threshold subcontracted one of 
its leases in an effort to avoid the ASF’s tax. 
 185. ARCTIC COUNCIL, ARCTIC MARINE SHIPPING ASSESSMENT 2009 REPORT 65 
(2009), available at www.arctic.noaa.gov/detect/documents/AMSA_2009_ 
Report_2nd_print.pdf. 
 186.  INTERNATIONAL OIL POLLUTION COMPENSATION FUNDS, LIABILITY AND 
COMPENSATION FOR POLLUTION DAMAGE, TEXTS OF THE 1992 CIVIL LIABILITY 
CONVENTION, THE 1992 FUND CONVENTION, AND THE SUPPLEMENTARY FUND 
PROTOCOL 3 (2011), available at http://www.iopcfunds.org/uploads/tx_ 
iopcpublications/Text_of_Conventions_e.pdf. 
 187.  Special Drawing Rights (SDRs), INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND (Oct. 3, 
2014), .http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/sdr.htm. 
 188.  International Convention on the Establishment of an International Fund for 
Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage (FUND), INTERNATIONAL MARITIME 
ORGANIZATION, www.imo.org/About/Conventions/ListOfConventions/Pages/ 
International-Convention-on-the-Establishment-of-an-International-Fund-for-
Compensation-for-Oil-Pollution-Damage-(FUND).aspx (last visited Oct. 4, 2014). 
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payable for one incident to 750 million SDRs.189 The supplemental fund 
is financed by contributions from states that receive a minimum of one 
million tons of oil each year.190 The goal of the CLC and its funds is to 
ensure that innocent third parties can be readily compensated for 
damages.191 The CLC and its funds operate similarly to a progressive 
tax—increasing a party’s financial responsibility in relation to the benefit 
it receives from oil transportation. 
The proposed ASF is similar to the CLC in the sense that it is 
funded by the parties who most benefit from drilling activities (major 
operators), and are in the best financial position to compensate third 
parties for their damages.192 Unlike the CLC, however, the ASF does not 
have a set fund limit, but would be proportional to the relative levels of 
extraction firms undertake. As a result, the ASF would, in effect, not 
come into existence until a firm or firms reached the extraction 
threshold, but would, in theory, grow in proportion to the level of 
extraction activities in the Arctic OCS. Consequently, the ASF would 
automatically increase the level of third-party damage protection as oil 
extraction efforts intensify. As constructed, only firms that successfully 
extract large amounts of hydrocarbons would pay into the ASF, so the 
“extraction tax” would be unlikely to serve as a deterrent for oil 
producers already dedicated to offshore Arctic drilling. 
Creating the ASF, along with increasing the strict liability cap, 
mandating third party insurance, and establishing a risk-based premium 
fund, should function to provide the appropriate incentives to ensure 
operators take the necessary safety precautions and invest in spill 
response technology, as well as provide an appropriate scheme for 
injured third parties to recover a large portion of damages. 
CONCLUSION 
Offshore oil drilling in the Alaskan Arctic presents an enormous 
opportunity for energy firms, the State of Alaska, and the United States 
 
 189.  INTERNATIONAL OIL POLLUTION COMPENSATION FUNDS, supra note 186. 
 190.  International Convention on the Establishment of an International 
Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage (FUND), supra note 188. 
 191.  INTERNATIONAL OIL POLLUTION COMPENSATION FUNDS, supra note 186. 
 192.  The ASF, as structured, is by no means the only option for a 
supplementary fund. For example, the ASF could include a provision where a 
firm that is responsible for a major accident that drained the supplementary 
fund would be required to refill the fund to its pre-spill level before the firm 
would be allowed to reconvene drilling activities. Another option is to create a 
fund based on the number of active drills a firm has in the Arctic (e.g., a firm 
would pay into the fund an amount in proportion to the number of drills it 
operates in a given season). 
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federal government. If drilling can be conducted safely, it could greatly 
reduce the United States’ reliance on foreign oil and would allow Alaska 
to remain one of the top energy-producing states in the country. 
However, drilling in the extreme conditions of the Arctic presents 
enormous technological challenges, as demonstrated by Shell’s struggles 
over the past few years.193 These technological challenges are further 
compounded by the Arctic’s remote location, lack of local infrastructure, 
and unique environment. In the event of a spill, environmental and 
innocent third-party damages can be enormous, as the Exxon Valdez and 
Deepwater Horizon accidents have demonstrated. 
While post-Deepwater Horizon regulatory reforms have, to a degree, 
improved the federal government’s ability to regulate the offshore oil 
industry, the agencies responsible for this task remain ill-equipped to do 
so. As a result, it is imperative that the United States’ regulatory regime 
properly incentivize firms to invest in the technological improvements 
that are necessary to safely drill in the extreme Arctic conditions. 
Additionally, even if an operator is taking the utmost safety precautions, 
accidents can still happen, and United States regulations need to more 
adequately ensure that innocent third parties are fully compensated for 
their damages. 
While there are a number of regulatory changes that could 
incentivize industry to operate safer and invest in technological 
improvements, it is first necessary for the existing limited liability to be 
increased to properly align industry safety incentives with the risk of 
operation. Second, the United States needs to create an adequate 
payment scheme to compensate innocent victims in the instance an 
operator cannot pay. To accomplish these goals, the United States 
should adopt a regulatory regime that: (1) significantly increases the 
liability cap; (2) requires increased financial responsibility in the form of 
third-party insurance (or an upfront deposit-bond); (3) establishes a risk-
based premium fund; and (4) creates a supplementary fund from 
contributions from firms that produce above a specific level. These 
proposals are interconnected, complementing each other to form a more 
comprehensive regime to ensure that industry is properly incentivized 
to invest in safety and technological improvements through increased 
strict liability and financial responsibility. They also ensure that 
damaged third parties are more adequately compensated through the 
increased strict liability and multiple funds. 
While the proposed regulations may make it nearly impossible for 
 
 193.  See Hobson, supra note 4 (describing Shell’s setbacks while attempting to 
drill in the Arctic). 
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non-major firms to enter the Arctic, this may be for the best, as major 
firms can more readily compensate the enormous costs that could result 
if an accident were to occur. Overall, an increased liability cap and 
matching financial security requirement in the form of third-party 
insurance, coupled with two adjustable pooled-insurance funds, should 
adequately incentivize firms to invest in operating safely and should not 
be so unduly coercive to prevent major oil companies from investing in 
offshore drilling in Arctic Alaska. 
